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Parker v. State: 
COURT OF 
APPEALS 
REAFFIRMS 
COMMITMENT TO 
ABSOLUTE 
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
FOR JUDICIAL 
ACTS. 
-::::- .. 
. -..1 ...... ,_" 
In Parker v. State, 337 
Md. 271,653 A.2d436 (1995), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that a circuit court 
judge is entitled to absolute im-
munity from tort actions, both 
under the Maryland Tort Claims 
Act and 42 U.S.c. § 1983. lnso 
holding, the court reaffirmed 
its commitment to absolute ju-
dicial immunity for judicial ac-
tions. 
On April 14, 1988, 
Doris Parker was convicted in 
district court for driving in ex-
cess of the speed limit and was 
fined $150. She appealed her 
conviction to the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City. After fail-
ing to appear on the date set for 
appeal, the circuit court deter-
mined that she had waived her 
right to an appeal and entered 
judgment against her. By Au-
gust 5, 1988, Parker had not 
paid the fine. On that date, 
Judge Roger W. Brown of the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
issued a warrant for her arrest. 
The Baltimore County Police 
Department was unable to serve 
her with the warrant despite 
several attempts. 
On May 31, 1989, 
Parker filed a motion with the 
circuit court to strike the dis-
missal and reinstate proceed-
ings. Judge Brown granted the 
motion and quashed the earlier 
warrant for her arrest. An ap-
peal de novo was held before 
another circuit court judge on 
September 22, 1989, at which 
Parker was acquitted of the 
speeding offense. 
On December 7, 1989, 
however, the Sheriff of Balti-
more City appeared before 
Judge Brown and requested a 
second arrest warrant on the 
basis of her "continued" failure 
to pay the $150 fine. Judge 
Brown issued the warrant with-
out calling the clerk's office or 
reviewing the docket entries 
which reflected Parker's Sep-
tember 22, 1989, acquittal. 
Parker was later arrested at her 
home and detained at a Balti-
more County police precinct 
until she paid the fine. Judge 
Brown ultimately quashed the 
arrest warrant on January 19, 
1990. 
Parker filed suit in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
against the State of Maryland 
under the Maryland Tort Claims 
Act, Code (1984, 1993 Repl. 
Vol., 1994 Cum. Supp.), §§ 12-
101 through 12-110 of the State 
Government Article, alleging 
false imprisonment, false arrest 
and negligence on the part of 
Judge Brown. She also sued 
under the Civil Rights Act of 
1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the 
erroneous issuance of the war-
rant. The court ultimately dis-
missed the action with preju-
dice. 
Parker then appealed the 
circuit court's dismissal of her 
action to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. Parker 
argued that Judge Brown was 
not entitled to judicial immuni-
ty because he lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case 
and personal jurisdiction over 
Parker when he issued the war-
rant. The court of special ap-
peals rej ected this argument and 
held Judge Brown absolutely 
immune from suit. Additional-
ly, the court held that judicial 
immunity attached if the judge 
had general subject matter ju-
risdiction regardless of wheth-
er or not he also had personal 
jurisdiction. 
Parker then appealed to 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, arguing that the judge 
could not be held immune from 
suit because he lacked jurisdic-
tion to issue the warrant for her 
arrest. Concerned by the ap-
proach of both the petitioner 
and Court of Special Appeals to 
the issue of judicial immunity, 
the court granted the petition 
for a writ of certiorari. 
The court began its anal-
ysis by focusing on Parker's 
state law claims under the Mary-
land Tort Claims Act. The court 
emphasized that the principle 
of absolute judicial immunity 
from civil liability has been a 
part of the common law for 
several centuries. Parker, 337 
Md. at 277, 653 A.2d at 439. 
The court further noted that the 
Supreme Court recognized and 
adopted the principle of judi-
cial immunity in Bradley v. 
Fisher, 68 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 
(1872), which has become the 
leading American case on the 
subject. Parker, 337 Md. at 
280, 653 A.2d at 440. Further-
more, the court concluded that 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
the common law principle of 
absolute judicial immunity for 
judicial acts has been reaffirmed 
in Maryland. Id. at 284, 653 
A.2d at 442. The court then 
distinguished between qualified 
immunity accorded to public 
officials and absolute immuni-
ty granted to judges. The court 
emphasized that absolute judi-
cial immunity, unlike qualified 
immunity, applies regardless of 
the nature of the suit. !d. As 
justification for this greater lev-
el of immunity, the court em-
phasized the need to " ... forestall 
endless collateral attacks onjudg-
ments through civil actions 
against the judges themselves." 
Id. at287, 653 A.2dat443. The 
court further suggested that al-
leged errors could be challenged 
through other mechanisms 
within the judicial system, in-
cluding removal procedures and 
the appellate process. Id. 
In rej ecting Parker's ar-
gument that Judge Brown 
lacked jurisdiction to issue a 
warrant for her arrest, the court 
noted that the issuance of arrest 
warrants is specifically within 
the jurisdiction of the circuit 
judge. Id. at 287, 653 A.2d at 
444. Thus, the court held that 
Judge Brown was entitled to 
absolute judicial immunity, and 
Parker's claims under the Mary-
land Torts Claims Act were 
properly dismissed. Id. 
The court then ad-
dressed Parker's federal law 
claim under the Civil Rights 
Act of1871, 42 U.S.c. § 1983. 
Recognizing that section 1983 
did not itself provide for immu-
nities, the court stated that the 
Supreme Court" ... has consis-
tently applied the common law 
concept of absolute judicial im-
munity, in its traditional form, 
to cases arising under section 
1983." Id. at 288,653 A.2d at 
445. Consequently, the court 
held that Judge Brown was also 
immune from suit under 
Parker's § 1983 claim against 
him. Id. at 290, 653 A.2d at 
445. Accordingly, the court 
affirmed the judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. 
In Parker v. State, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that a circuit court judge 
could not be held civilly liable, 
under either state or federal law , 
for performing a judicial act. 
Adhering to common law prin-
ciples, the court reaffirmed the 
principle of absolute judicial 
immunity set forth by the Su-
preme Court over one hundred 
years ago. In so doing, the court 
maintained a longstanding prin-
ciple necessary for detached and 
impartial decision making in 
disputes between adverse par-
ties. 
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